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1. Introduction
Many authors (Atkinson (1972), Tuomala (1984, 1990), Diamond (1998), 
Saez (2001) etc.) have explored the empirical and policy implications of the 
conditions established by Mirlees (1971) for the optimality of the personal 
income tax-transfer rule.
Two main focal points of interests have dominated these investigations: i) 
the profile of marginal tax rates; ii) the design of the mechanism of income 
support.
We can distinguish two «generations» of studies. The first (discussed 
in Section 2), from 1971 up to the late ’90s, mainly consists of illustrative 
numerical exercises rather than of empirical applications. The optimal tax-
transfer regime that most commonly emerges from these efforts is a negative 
income tax + a (almost) flat tax.
The second generation (Section 3) is characterized by a more definite fo-
cus on the policy implementation of the optimal taxation theory. These stud-
ies rely on extensions or reformulations of Mirrlees’s model and attempt to es-
tablish a closer connection between theory and data or econometric estimates.
The present paper argues (Section 4) that both generations of studies suf-
fer from taking for granted that the solution to the optimal taxation problem 
must be an analytical one (a «formula»), to be fed with numerical guesses 
or estimates. As a first consequence, the theoretical models must adopt very 
restrictive assumptions in order to generate analytical solutions. As a second 
RIVISTA ITALIANA DEGLI ECONOMISTI / a. XIV, n. 1, aprile 2009
* Dipartimento di Economia Cognetti De Martiis, Torino and Financial support by 
MURST and by Compagnia di San Paolo is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank 
CHILD and Collegio Carlo Alberto for organizational support. CHILD-Collegio Carlo Al-
berto, Moncalieri (TO) e-mail: ugo.colombino@unito.it.
 I am grateful to an anoymous referee for useful comments.
48
consequence, the theoretical results are potentially inconsistent with the em-
pirical estimates that are typically generated under very different (much less 
restrictive) assumptions.
We illustrate (Section 5) two exercises adopting a different approach (a 
third generation?), where restrictive theoretical assumptions are avoided and 
the solution is obtained computationally by iteratively simulating a very flex-
ible microeconometric model.
2. The First Generation
We start by recalling the basic model introduced by Mirrlees (1971) – in 
a version with preferences separable in income and effort.
Agents – households – differ only in their market productivity w.
An agent with productivity w solves
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where
w = market productivity (e.g. wage rate)
c = net available income
h = hours of work (or, more generally, effort)
T(z) = tax to be paid by an agent with income z = wh
The Social Planner solves
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The social planner knows the distribution F(w) but not the individual 
values of w (or at least she is not willing – or allowed – to use them). The 
tax T only depends on wh (second-best solution).
By solving (2.2) we get:
(2.3) 
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e(w) = elasticity of the supply of h with respect to the net wage
( )?? w  = compensated elasticity of the supply of h with respect to the net wage
and l is the multiplier associated to the public budget constraint (= social 
value of public funds), so that gm is the social marginal value (relative to 
public funds) of a w-agent’s income.
In expression (2.3), in general Yw denotes a function Y evaluated at the 
optimal choice made by an agent with productivity w, Ysw  denotes the first 
derivative of Yw with respect to some variable s.
Expression (2.3) together with the public budget constraint also deter-
mines the amount of a lump-sum transfer (positive or negative).
Expressions like (2.3) since 1971 have been used by many authors in or-
der to investigate the implications of the model with numerical illustrations. 
These exercises require specifying: 
i) the utility function u;
ii) the productivity distribution function F;
iii) the Social Welfare Function W;
iv) the required amount of total net taxes R.
As a loose guide to deciding upon the above specifications, the authors 
adopt a «calibration» criterion, meaning that the chosen specification should 
conform to some degree of realism (for example it should generate a distri-
bution of gross income that resembles a real one).
These exercises have been mostly disappointing for those – probably in-
cluding Mirrlees himself – who expected an optimal profile of monotonically 
increasing marginal tax rates. In fact, the results tend to converge to the fol-
lowing optimal tax-transfer rule:
– a lump-sum (positive) transfer;
– very high (and declining) marginal tax rates on low incomes up to a 
break-even point (where gross income is equal to the transfer);
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– constant or slightly increasing marginal tax rates beyond the break-
even point.
If we translate the above scenario into a policy reform, by and large it 
corresponds to a Negative Income Tax + a (almost) Flat Tax (NIT + FT).
More or less egalitarian Social Welfare functions imply different level of 
the transfer and of the average tax but do not significantly change the mar-
ginal tax rates profile.
Up to recent years, most researchers working in the optimal taxation area 
tended to conclude that the above scenario was the definitive lesson to be 
drawn from Mirrlees’s model. If one was looking for a model envisaging a 
progressive profile of increasing marginal tax rates, it had to be searched for 
outside that model.
Recent contributions by Tuomala (2006; 2008) however, convincingly ar-
gue that the results recalled above are very likely to be forced by too restric-
tive or too unrealistic specifications chosen for the numerical simulation. In 
particular, it appears that typical assumptions such as: a constant elasticity of 
labour supply, a constant (or missing) income effect, common utility specifi-
cation such as the Cobb-Douglas, the CES, or the quasi-linear, and produc-
tivity distributions such as the log-normal, all tend to favour something close 
to the NIT + FT scenario.
Tuomala (2008), for example, presents a numerical illustration that adopts 
a much more flexible specification for the utility function, namely a quad-
ratic form. As a first consequence, he gets a pattern of heterogeneous (with 
respect to income levels) elasticities and income effects that closely matches 
the empirical evidence. Moreover he obtains an optimal solution that envis-
ages a lump-sum transfer and a profile of monotonically increasing marginal 
tax rates, i.e. something that resembles a Universal Basic Income + a Pro-
gressive Tax (UBI + PT).
3. The Second Generation
The numerical exercises of the First Generation have mainly an illustrative 
character and do not (or at least not explicitly) aim at realistically evaluating or 
recommending specific reforms inspired by the optimal taxation results.
More recently, a series of contributions have tried to establish a more 
direct connection between optimal taxation theory and the design of policy 
reforms. As a corollary of the more policy-oriented position, these contribu-
tions develop new versions of the basic Mirrlees’s model and use not only 
simple «calibration» procedures, as was the case with the First Generation 
studies, but also real datasets and econometric estimates. 
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Saez (2001; 2002) presents reformulations of Mirrlees’s model more di-
rectly interpretable in terms of empirically observable variables. In particu-
lar, Saez (2002) develops a discrete model that assigns a crucial role to the 
relative magnitude of the labour supply elasticities at the extensive and at the 
intensive margin. This framework turned out to be very influential in the last 
few years and therefore we illustrate it with more details. 
There are J + 1 types of jobs, each paying (in increasing order) zo, zl, ...zj. 
Job «0» is non-participation o unemployment. 
Net available income on job j is
(3.1) cj = zj – Tj
where Tj is the tax paid at income level zj.
Each agent is characterized by one of the potential incomes zo, zl, ...z and 
if she decides to work she is allocated to the corresponding job.
The agent of type j decides to work if cj ≥ co.
The extensive margin (or participation) elasticity is defined as:
(3.2) 0
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where pj is the proportion of agents on job of type j.
Working agents can also move to a different job if income opportunities 
change, but the movements (for reasons implicit in the assumptions of the 
model) are limited to adjacent jobs (i.e. from job j to job j – 1 or job j + 1).
The intensive margin elasticity is defined as:
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Then it turns out that the optimal taxes satisfy:
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where gk is the marginal social value (relative to the value of public funds) of 
income at job k.
It must be noted that in the model there are no income effects and 
choices at the intensive margin are restricted in a very special way. Despite 
these limitations the model is attractive for several reasons:
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– it assigns a crucial and easily interpretable role to the two type of elas-
ticities;
– it is simple to implement empirically;
– it seems to fit well into the popular framework that models labour sup-
ply as a discrete choice;
– differently from Mirrlees (1971), it allows for negative marginal tax 
rates: this may be the case if the participation elasticities are sufficiently large 
with respect to the intensive margin elasticities.
So far we know four applications of this model: 
Blundell et al. 2006 (optimal taxation of single mothers in Germany and 
UK);
Haan et al. 2007 (optimal design of children benefits in Germany); 
Immervoll et al. 2007 (evaluation of income maintenance policies in Eu-
ropean countries);
Brewer et al. 2008 (report prepared for the Mirrlees Commission for tax 
reform in the UK).
In all the four applications the model tends to attest the superiority of 
mechanisms such as in-work benefits (i.e. rules involving negative marginal 
taxes, or subsidies on the wage rate) over alternatives like NIT or UBI.
It might be the case that the simplifications adopted by the model some-
how force the result. Since the role of the two types of elasticities is so pre-
dominant and since empirically the participation elasticity tends to be much 
larger than the intensive-margin elasticity, maybe it is not so surprising that 
the optimal rule turns out to be one envisaging subsidies on low wages rather 
than transfers on low incomes.
Nonetheless it is important that the model adds a new scenario (in-work 
benefits) as an alternative to what appeared to be the inescapable consensus 
– i.e. the NIT + FT – in the first generation of studies.
4. A critique
The studies belonging to the First and Second generation have much 
in common as to the type of solution they aim at and as to the relation-
ship between the theoretical solution and the empirical evidence. More 
precisely:
1) The researcher looks for an analytical solution to the optimal taxation 
problem, i.e. a «formula» that allows to compute the optimal taxes or mar-
ginal tax rates as function of exogenous variables and parameters.
2) The numerical simulations consist in calculating the analytical solution 
with exogenous variables and parameters assigned numerical values produced 
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by «educated guesses» (first generation) or econometric estimates (more of-
ten in the second generation).
As an example, consider expression (3.4). We might start by defining in 
some natural way the J+1 type of jobs (or income level). We should be able 
to observe the proportion po, pl, ...pj of agents occupying the various posi-
tions and the corresponding (for example average) income level. Then we 
might borrow some econometric estimates of the elasticities. At that point 
we would be in the position of computing the optimal taxes.
What’s wrong with this way of proceeding?
The original sin resides in the idea of an analytical solution. Clearly an 
analytical solution is very useful to understand (and teach) the «grammar» of 
the problem. But when it comes to evaluating or designing actual tax-transfer 
rules, insisting on an analytical solution as a starting point has many undesir-
able implications.
1) First, in order to get an analytical solution we are forced to adopt 
many simplifying and restrictive assumptions. 
2) Second, when we «feed» the formulas with empirical measures, we are 
very likely to face an inconsistency between the theoretical results and the 
empirical evidence, since the latter was typically generated under assumptions 
that are very different for those that made it possible obtaining the former.
The interesting paper by Blundell et al. (2006) represents however an ex-
ample of this potential inconsistency. This study adopts the model of Saez 
(2002) and in particular it uses expression (3.4) by assigning numerical val-
ues to the elasticities derived from estimates obtained with a detailed micro-
econometric model. However, we have seen that Saez (2002) assumes there 
are no income effects and specifies a very special and limited representation 
of choices at the intensive margin. None of these assumptions are shared by 
the microeconometric model used to measure the elasticities. The micro-
econometric model is much more flexible, it accounts for income effects and 
implies very different responses at the intensive margin. So we might expect 
that the elasticities produced by the microeconometric model do not fit well 
into the framework on which expression (3.4) is based.
Modern microeconometric models (in this area we are talking of models 
of labour supply) are based on very general and flexible assumptions. They 
can accommodate many realistic features such as general structures of het-
erogeneous preferences, simultaneous decisions of household members, non-
unitary mechanisms of household decisions, complicated (non-convex, non 
continuous, non-differentiable etc.) constraints and opportunity sets, multidi-
mensional heterogeneity of both households and jobs, quantitative constraints 
etc. It is simply not feasible (at least so far) to obtain analytical solutions for 
the optimal taxation problem in such environments. Yet those features are 
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very relevant and important especially in view of evaluating or designing re-
forms.
In the next section we illustrate and exemplify an alternative procedure, 
which consists in using a microeconometric model to obtain a computational 
solution of the optimal taxation problem. Analytical solutions might still re-
main useful for example in suggesting promising classes of tax-transfer sys-
tems that can then be more deeply investigated with the microeconometric 
model. The latter, which primarily simulates the agents’ choices by utility 
maximization, is embedded into a global maximization algorithm that solves 
the social planner’s problem, i.e. the maximization of a social welfare func-
tion subject to the public budget constraint. The philosophy inspiring this 
approach is similar to the one adopted since long ago in engineering and re-
cently and successfully also in other applications of mechanism design (auc-
tions, negotiation procedures, matching markets etc.: Roth (2002) provides a 
very inspired survey). The analytical solution is complemented by computa-
tional experiments that account for a host of realistic features that cannot be 
included in the theoretical model: 
Consider the design of suspension bridges. The simple theoretical model in 
which the only force is gravity, and beams are perfectly rigid, is elegant and gene-
ral. But bridge design also concerns metallurgy and soil mechanics, and the sideways 
forces of water and wind. Many questions concerning these complications can’t be 
answered analytically, but must be explored using physical or computational models. 
These complications, and how they interact with the parts of the physics captured by 
the simple model, are the domain of the engineering literature (Roth 2002).
5. A Third Generation?
In this section I illustrate two examples of the computational approach 
sketched at the end of Section 4. The first exercise (Aaberge and Colombino 
2008) identifies the optimal tax-transfer rule within a class of piecewise-linear 
rules. The second exercise adopts a similar methodology in order to investi-
gate the performance of various alternative mechanisms of income support in 
European countries (Colombino et al. 2008).
5.1. An optimal tax-transfer rule
In Aaberge and Colombino (2008) the optimal taxation problem is for-
mulated as follows.
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Agent n can choose a «job» within an opportunity set Bn. Each job is 
defined by a wage rate w, hours of work h and other characteristics j (unob-
served by the analyst). Given gross earnings wh and gross unearned income 
I, net available income is determined by a tax-transfer function c = f(wh, I, ϑ) 
defined up to a vector of parameters ϑ.
For the sake of simplicity, the problem is illustrated here as if the agents 
were single individuals, but in fact the exercise treats both singles and cou-
ples.
The class of tax-transfer rules considered is defined as follows:
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where is income after tax, Z is the sum of gross market income (earnings 
plus capital income) and taxable public transfers, T is a tax-free public trans-
fer (positive or negative), E is the exemption level, (t1, t2, t3, t4) are the mar-
ginal tax rates applied to the four brackets of income above the exemption 
level, Z1 is the upper limit of the first bracket, Z2 is the upper limit of the 
second bracket, Z3 is the upper limit of the third bracket and T is a lump-
sum that can be positive (i.e. a lump-sum transfer) or negative (i.e. a lump-
sum tax). Thus, each particular tax rule is characterized by the nine param-
eters: r = (E, t1, t2, t3, t4, Z1, Z2, Z3, T). In the exercise presented hereafter 
the top marginal tax rate is constrained to be t4 ≤ 0.751.
For any given tax-transfer rule (i.e. any given value of ϑ) the choices by 
the agents are simulated by a microeconometric model with 78 parameters 
1 This upper limit is imposed for the sake of realism, since it is the highest top marginal 
tax rate on personal income reached in Norway in the period 1980-2000.
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estimated on 1994 Norwegian data. The model allows for a very flexible rep-
resentation of heterogeneous preferences and opportunity sets, it covers both 
singles and couples, and it accounts for quantity constraints and is able to 
treat any tax-transfer rule however complex2. Note that it would be hopeless 
to look for analytical solutions of an optimal taxation problem in such an 
environment.
As an illustration of the implications of the model, especially as to het-
erogeneity of behaviour, Tables 1 and 2 report the wage elasticities and the 
income elasticities of labour supply. In particular: Table 1 shows the sharp 
decline of wage elasticity w.r.t. income levels (especially for married females); 
Table 2 shows that income elasticities are far from irrelevant, thus cast-
ing reservations on the frequently adopted assumptions of zero income ef-
fects (the same observation holds concerning cross-wage elasticities in Table 
1). The same model, when estimated on Italian data, produces a very similar 
pattern of elasticities3.
The choices made by the N agents results in N positions (c1, h1, j1), (c2, 
h2, j2),..., (cN, hN, jN) which are then evaluated by the social planner according 
to a Social Welfare function
 W(V(c1, h1, j1), V(c2, h2, j2),..., V(cN, hN, jN)).
The function V is a common utility function used to make the N posi-
tions interpersonally comparable.
The Social Planner’s problem therefore consists of searching for the value 
of the parameters r that maximizes W subject to the following constraints:
1) the various positions (c1, h1, j1),..., (cN, hN, jN) result from utility-maxi-
mizing choices on the part of the agents (incentive-compatibility constraints);
2) the total net tax revenue must attain a given amount R (public budget 
constraint).
The social welfare function W is of the rank-dependent type4. Depend-
ing on the value assigned to an inequality-aversion parameter it can represent 
different criteria such as Utilitarian, Gini, Bonferroni etc.
The Social Planner’s problem is solved by iteratively running the micro-
econometric model according to a global maximization algorithm that effi-
ciently scans the tax-transfer parameter space.
2 Besides Aaberge and Colombino (2008), other papers also illustrate previous versions 
of the model estimated on Italian data: Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999; 2004) and Aa-
berge, Colombino, Strøm and Wennemo (2000).
3 See for example Aaberge, Colombino and Wennemo (2002).
4 See Aaberge and Colombino (2008) for more details.
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Tab. 1.  Labour supply elasticities with respect to wage for single females, single males, married females and 
married males by deciles of household disposable income. Norway 1994
Family status Type of elasticity Income 
decile under 
the 1994 tax 
system
Female elasticities Male elasticities
Own wage 
elasticities
Cross 
elasticities
Own wage 
elasticities
Cross 
elasticities
Single females and 
males
Elasticity of the proba-
bility of participation
I 0.59 0.00
II 0.45 0.00
III-VIII 0.06 0.06
IX 0.00 0.00
X 0.00 0.00
All 0.12 0.04
Elasticity of the con-
ditional expectation of 
total supply of hours
I –0.17 0.77
II –0.04 0.00
III-VIII –0.08 –0.08
IX –0.07 0.00
X 0.00 0.00
All –0.09 –0.02
Elasticity of the uncon-
ditional expectation of 
total supply of hours
I 0.42 0.77
II 0.42 0.00
III-VIII –0.02 –0.02
IX –0.07 0.00
X 0.00 0.00
All 0.02 0.02
Married/cohabitating 
females and males
Elasticity of the proba-
bility of participation
I 1.03 –0.28 0.90 –0.23
II 0.35 –0.14 0.79 0.00
III-VIII 0.14 –0.23 0.13 –0.10
IX 0.12 –0.12 0.06 –0.06
X 0.07 0.00 0.06 –0.19
All 0.21 –0.19 0.23 –0.11
Elasticity of the con-
ditional expectation of 
total supply of hours
I 1.51 –0.01 0.87 0.11
II 0.62 –0.53 0.38 –0.08
III-VIII 0.27 –0.24 0.18 –0.14
IX 0.08 –0.22 0.02 –0.09
X 0.19 –0.10 –0.02 –0.23
All 0.31 –0.25 0.16 –0.13
Elasticity of the uncon-
ditional expectation of 
total supply of hours
I 2.54 –0.29 1.77 –0.12
II 0.97 –0.67 1.17 –0.08
III-VIII 0.41 –0.47 0.31 –0.24
IX 0.20 –0.34 0.08 –0.14
X 0.26 –0.10 0.05 –0.42
All 0.52 –0.42 0.39 –0.23
Source: Aaberge and Colombino (2008).
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Table 3 displays the optimal tax-transfer systems according to four dif-
ferent social welfare criteria, in decreasing degree of inequality aversion from 
Bonferroni to Utilitarian. 
Figure 1 illustrates the three optimal tax-transfer rules and the current 
(1994) rule as mappings from gross income to net income.
We can observe:
a) Under any social welfare function, the marginal tax rates are continu-
ously increasing for all levels of income. The lump-sum transfer turns out to 
be a tax (modest in the Utilitarian and Gini cases, more substantial in the 
Bonferroni case) In view of a practical implementation, the lump-sum tax 
might be approximated by a reduction of the (almost) universal transfers that 
Tab. 2.  Labour supply elasticities with respect to non-labour income for single females, single males, married 
females and married males by deciles of household disposable income. Norway 1994
Family status Income decile 
under the 1994 
tax system
Females Males
Elasticity of the probability of 
participation
I –0.59 0
II 0 0
III-VIII –0.71 –0.12
IX –1.38 –0.33
X –1.33 –0.83
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours
I 0.43 0
II 0 0
III-VIII 0.08 0.05
IX –0.21 0.05
X –0.51 –0.42
Elasticity of the unconditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours
I –0.18 0
II 0 0
III-VIII –0.63 –0.07
IX –1.56 –0.29
X –1.81 –1.22
Married/cohab. females 
and males
Elasticity of the probability of 
participation
I 0 0
II 0 0.07
III-VIII –0.16 –0.17
IX –0.23 –0.46
X –0.81 –0.82
Elasticity of the conditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours
I 0 0
II –0.05 –0.08
III-VIII –0.05 –0.03
IX –0.14 –0.01
X –0.22 –0.32
Elasticity of the unconditional 
expectation of total supply of 
hours
I 0 0
II –0.05 –0.01
III-VIII –0.21 –0.20
IX –0.37 –0.47
X –1.01 –1.11
Source: Aaberge and Colombino (2008).
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Tab. 3.  Optimal tax rules according to alternative social welfare criteria*. (t1 constrained to be ≤ 0.75). Nor-
way 1994
Bonferroni Gini Utilitarian
t1 0.06 0.16 0.23
t2 0.30 0.26 0.28
t3 0.39 0.38 0.33
t4 0.75 0.75 0.75
T –11,900 –6,000 –2,800
E 29,000 21,000 24,000
Z1 120,000 130,000 210,000
Z2 220,000 230,000 280,000
Z3 720,000 710,000 740,000
* E, T, Z1, Z2 and Z3 are measured in thousands of 1994 NOK (1 NOK ≅ 0.12 Euros).
Source: Aaberge and Colombino (2008).
1994 Utilitarian Gini Bonferroni
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
–100
2000 12001000
N
et
 in
co
m
e 
(t
ho
us
an
ds
 N
O
K
 1
99
4)
600 800400
Gross income (thousands NOK 1994)
Fig. 1.  Optimal tax-transfer rules versus current rule. Norway 1994.
characterize the current system (essentially family allowances and child bene-
fits or by a tax on «unearned» income (wealth, houses, etc.). Altogether then 
the optimal tax-transfer rule might be seen as envisaging a universal trans-
fer (a demogrant), a tax on wealth or property and a sequence of monotoni-
cally increasing marginal tax rates starting from 0 up to 75%. The above re-
sults are compatible with scenarios like UBI + PT or even In-Work Benefits 
mechanisms but not with scenarios like NIT + FT. This picture is in sharp 
contrast with most of the results obtained by the numerical exercises based 
on Mirrlees’s optimal tax formulas. As we have seen in Section 2, the typical 
outcome of those exercises envisages a lump-sum transfer which is progres-
sively taxed away by very high marginal tax rates on lower incomes (i.e. a 
negative income tax mechanism); beyond the income level where the transfer 
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is exhausted, the marginal tax rates remains constant or slightly increasing. 
The papers by Tuomala (2006; 2008) also mentioned in Section 2 show how-
ever that those results might be forced by the restrictive assumptions typi-
cally made upon preferences, elasticities and the distribution of productivity 
(or wage rates). Interestingly, when Tuomala (2008) adopts a more flexible 
specification of the utility function he gets results that are qualitatively close 
to those in Aaberge and Colombino (2008).
b) The more egalitarian the criterion, the more progressive is the optimal 
rule. For example the optimal rule according to Bonferroni is more progres-
sive than the optimal rule according to Gini, which in turn is more progres-
sive than the optimal Utilitarian rule. However, even the Utilitarian criterion 
requires a very progressive rule, which suggests that the progressivity of the 
marginal tax rates responds to efficiency purposes as well as to equality pur-
poses.
c) It turns out that all the optimal rules imply a higher income after tax 
for most levels of gross income with respect to the current system. In other 
words, the optimal rules are able to extract the same total tax revenue from 
a larger total gross income (i.e. applying a lower average tax rate). The re-
sult is due to a sufficiently high labour supply response estimated and ac-
counted for by the model. The optimal rules induce (some of) the house-
holds to move to alternatives with longer hours and/or higher wages. Sec-
ond, the optimal marginal tax rates applied to average or low and average 
income brackets are markedly lower than the ones implied by the current 
tax rule. This result provides a controversial perspective in view of the tax 
reforms implemented in many developed countries during the last decades. 
In most cases those reforms embodied the idea of improving efficiency and 
labour supply incentives through a lower average tax rate and lower marginal 
tax rates on higher incomes. Our optimal tax computations give support to 
the first part (lowering the average tax rate), much less to the second; on the 
contrary our results suggest that a lower average tax rate should be obtained 
by lowering the marginal tax rates particularly on low and average income 
brackets. Clearly the pattern of elasticities – sharply decreasing with respect 
to income – illustrated in Table 1 contributes to the profile of the optimal 
marginal tax rates.
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5.2. An evaluation of alternative basic income policies
The second example is based on a preliminary report (Colombino et al. 
2008) for a project in progress5. The approach is the same as in Aaberge and 
Colombino (2008) although the specification of the microeconometric model 
is somewhat simpler. The purpose is evaluating various different designs of 
basic income policies. Taxes are modelled in a very simple way, either a flat 
tax or a progressive tax with a constant progressivity index.
The results illustrated here are limited to four countries (Denmark, Italy, 
Portugal and United Kingdom). The exercise is devoted to evaluating and 
ranking the performance of various hypothetical reforms of the tax-transfer 
system.
Negative Income Tax + Flat Tax (NIT + FT):
This is a pure basic version of the widely discussed proposal originally 
and independently conceived by M. Friedman and J. Tobin. The rule is:
Net income = G if Gross Income < = G
Net income = G + (1 – t)*(Gross Income – G) if Gross Income > G
where t is a constant marginal tax rate, 
G = aPs = Minimum Guaranteed Income;
P = basic poverty line = (1/2) median household income in the sample;
a is a proportion (we simulate various versions with different values of a: 
1, 0.75, 0.50 and 0.25),
s is an equivalence scale that adjusts the basic poverty line according to 
the number of people (N) in the household. 
The marginal tax rate t is endogenously determined by the simulation al-
gorithm so that the net tax revenue is equal to the one collected under the 
current system.
Work Fare + Flat Tax (WF + FT):
This is similar to the NIT + FT, but the transfer to households with Gross 
Income < G is given only if either the husband or the wife (or both) work at 
least an average of H weekly hours6. In the simulation illustrated hereafter 
we set H = 20. This system, although based on a transfer rather than a wage 
subsidy, is close to some reforms recently introduced in the US and the UK 
5 Reddito Minimo Garantito: un nodo cruciale nel disegno della politica sociale in Eu-
ropa. The research receives financial support from Compagnia di San Paolo and MIUR as a 
PRIN2006 project.
6 See for example Fortin et al. (1993).
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and currently discussed also in continental Europe (Earnings Tax Credit, In-
Work Benefits etc.).
Participation Basic Income + Flat Tax (PBI + FT):
This is discussed among others by A. B. Atkinson (1996; 1998). Under 
this rule, every household receives a transfer equal to G (computed as above) 
irrespective of the Gross Income, provided either partner is working (any 
number of hours). Gross income is then taxed according to FT.
Universal Basic Income + Flat Tax (UBI + FT): 
This is the basic version of the system discussed for example by Van Par-
ijs (1995). Under this rule, every household receives a transfer equal to G 
(computed as above) irrespective of the Gross Income. Gross income is then 
taxed according to FT: 
Net Income = G + (1 – t)*(Gross Income).
Negative Income Tax + Progressive Tax (NIT + PT):
Net income = G + (Gross income – G)(1 – t) if Gross Income > G
where t is a constant, and can be interpreted as an index of progressivity.
The parameter t is endogenously determined by the simulation algorithm 
so that the net tax revenue is equal to the one collected under the current 
system.
Work Fare + Progressive Tax (WF + PT):
As with WF + FT, but we use PT instead of FT.
Participation Basic Income + Progressive Tax (PBI + PT):
As with PBI + FT, but we use PT instead of FT.
Universal Basic Income + Progressive Tax (UBI + PT):
As with UBI + FT, but we use PT instead of FT.
Table 4, 5 and 6 present an evaluation summary which focuses on four 
criteria, S(U), S(C), W(U) and W(C):
S(U) = Social Welfare (utility-based) = Mean (U)*(1 – Gini (U)), where 
Mean (U) and Gini (U) are respectively the mean and the Gini coefficient 
of the distribution of expected maximum utility levels attained by the house-
holds;
S(C) = Social Welfare (income-based) = Mean (C)*(1 – Gini (C)), where 
Mean (C) and Gini (C) are respectively the mean and the Gini coefficient of 
the distribution of net available income attained by the households; 
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W(U) = proportion of households whose expected maximum utility in-
creases;
W(C) = proportion of households whose net available income increases.
Four each country and each criterion, we «grade» the reforms
with an «A» if it is the best one in that country according to that crite-
rion;
with a «B» if it is the second best in that country according to that crite-
rion;
with a «C» if it fares better than the current tax-transfer system in that 
country according to that criterion. 
Table 4 shows the grades defined above for all the policies and all the 
countries. Overall, the most successful reforms are PBI and UBI, in particu-
lar in their progressive versions. PBI + PT and UBI + PT get 12 «A», 8 «B» 
and 75 «C». On the other hand, PBI + FT and UBI + FT get 3 «A», 11 «B» 
and 67 «C». Therefore there seem to be a clear indication of the superiority 
of non means-tested policies. A partial exception is represented by NIT in 
Italy, where it shows a performance almost comparable to that attained by 
PBI and UBI.
A second indication is that progressive systems seem to perform some-
what better than flat systems. We already noted that the progressive versions 
of PBI and UBI overall get higher grades than their non progressive versions. 
But this is true also of NIT. Progressive rules apply higher marginal tax rates 
on higher incomes and lower marginal tax rates on lower incomes (as com-
pared to the flat rules). Members of households with higher income tend to 
show a lower elasticity of labour supply (w.r.t. wage). Therefore the progres-
sive rules seem to exploit more efficiently the elasticity profile and induce 
the generation of a higher level of income. A third conclusion suggested by 
Table 4 is that for each country there are many reforms that would improve 
things according to at least one of the criteria. Italy appears to be the coun-
try the most amenable to a reform, in the sense that any type of basic income 
reform (in some version) would improve upon the current status. In this per-
spective, United Kingdom is somehow second after Italy, Portugal is third 
and last comes Denmark. Otherwise said, Denmark has, in relative terms, a 
very successful policy on income support and it is therefore difficult to im-
prove upon it.
Immervoll et al. (2007) find that in-work benefits (close to our Work-
fare) dominate – on a social welfare basis – more universalistic transfer poli-
cies (close to our UBI or NIT). The picture emerging from our exercise is 
less clear-cut: as a matter of fact, a social welfare-based evaluation would 
suggest a slight superiority of the universalistic policies. The analysis of Im-
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mervoll et al. (2007) is based on theoretical optimal taxation results (Saez 
2002) that require restrictive assumptions on preferences and choices (no 
income effects, no interaction among partners, little heterogeneity in behav-
iour), which might contribute to explaining the differences between their re-
sults and the ones illustrated here.
The above picture can change substantially if, besides the welfaristic cri-
teria of Table 4, we also account for other criteria that might be relevant 
from the perspective of political sustainability. For example it might be ar-
gued that policy requiring «too high» top marginal tax rates could not be 
realistically considered. Table 5 excludes from the rankings the reforms that 
imply a top marginal tax rate higher than 55%. We choose this figure as a 
hypothetical politically feasible upper limit because it is close to the top mar-
ginal tax rate applied to personal incomes in European countries; in 2000, 
the four highest top effective marginal tax rates applied in Europe are 60.0% 
(Netherlands), 55.4% (Sweden), 54.3% Denmark and 53.8% (Germany)7.
Other constraints to reform design and implementation might come from 
the implications on the choices or the conditions of specific segments of the 
population. For example the female participation rate is a matter of concern 
in the European political-economic debate. In Table 6 we further exclude 
from the grading the policies implying a reduction of female participation 
rate.
Table 6 suggests that in the countries with a relatively low female par-
ticipation rate (Italy and Portugal) many welfare-improving policies do not 
survive to the application of the additional feasibility constraints: non means-
tested policy like UBI or PBI appear to be too costly or have adverse incen-
tives on labour supply; more selective policies such as WF or NIT are more 
likely to be feasible. On the other hand, in Denmark (the country with the 
highest female participation rate) all the welfare-improving policies survive. 
United Kingdom represents an intermediate case. Economic systems that 
have attained a high female participation rate are better equipped to imple-
ment universalistic basic income policies. Economic systems with low female 
participation rates tend instead to face a high price in terms of tax burden 
and supply disincentives.
7 OECD tax database (http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase).
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6. Further perspectives for the Third Generation
An objection to the approach exemplified in Section 5 might be that, in-
deed, it is example-dependent. A different dataset (a different country, the 
same country in a different year, a different demographic composition etc.) 
would likely produce different results. It seems that we have been able to 
avoid too restrictive assumptions but at the price of loosing generality. On 
the other hand, expressions (2.3) or (3.4) establish a precise and general re-
lationship between optimal tax rates and characteristics of the economy such 
as the distribution of productivity, labour supply elasticity etc. Can we attain 
something similar within the computational approach? In principle the an-
swer is affirmative. We can compute optimal taxes on many different econ-
omies, and then investigate the relationship between the characteristics of 
those economies and the corresponding optimal taxes. Certainly the objects 
to be put in relation are complex objects (structured clusters of variables 
and parameters), so the analysis would probably require a sort of general-
ized comparative statics: but appropriate techniques are becoming available 
for this purpose8.
 References
Aaberge R. - Colombino U. - Strøm S. (1999), Labour Supply in Italy: An Empirical 
Analysis of Joint Household Decisions, with Taxes and Quantity Constraints, in 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 14, pp. 403-422.
Aaberge R. - Colombino U. - Wennemo T. (2002), Heterogeneity in the elasticity 
of labor supply in Italy and some policy implications, CHILD Working Paper, 
# 20/2002.
Aaberge R. - Colombino U. - Strøm S. (2004), Do More Equal Slices Shrink the 
Cake? An Empirical Investigation of Tax-Transfer Reform Proposals in Italy, in 
Journal of Population Economics, 17, pp. 767-785.
Aaberge R. - Colombino U. - Strøm S. - Wennemo T. (2000), Joint Labour Supply of 
Married Couples: Efficiency and Distribution Effects of Tax and Labour Market 
Reforms, in L. Mitton, H. Sutherland and M. Weeks (eds.), in Micro-simulation 
Modelling for Policy Analysis: Challenges and Innovations, Cambridge University 
Press.
Aaberge R. - Colombino U. (2008), Designing Optimal Taxes with a Microeconomet-
ric Model of Household Labour Supply, CHILD Working Paper, # 06/2008.
8 I refer for example to the techniques pioneered by P. Milgrom and J. Roberts for the 
analysis of organizational structures, e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1994).
69
Atkinson A.B. (1972), Maximin and optimal income taxation, Discussion Paper No. 
47, University of Essex.
Atkinson A.B. (1996), The Case for a Participation Income, in The Political Quar-
terly, 67, pp. 67-70.
Atkinson A.B. (1998), Poverty in Europe, Oxford, Blackwell.
Blundell R. - M. Brewer - Haan P. - Shephard A. (2006), Optimal Income Taxation of 
Lone Mothers: an Empirical Comparison for Germany and the UK, mimeo.
Brewer M. - Saez M. - Shephard A. (2008), Optimal Household Labor Income Tax 
and Transfer Programs: An Application to the UK, http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrlees-
review.
Colombino U. - Locatelli M. - Narazani E. - O’Donoghue C. - Shima I. (2008), Be-
havioural and Welfare Effects of Minimum Guaranteed Income Policies: A Simula-
tion for European Countries, CHILD Working Paper # 03/2008 (Also: EURO-
MOD Working Paper No. EM5/08).
Diamond P. (1998), Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped pattern 
of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates, in American Economic Review, 88, pp. 83-95.
Fortin B. - Truchon M. - Beauséjour L. (1993), On Reforming the Welfare System: 
Workfare meets the Negative Income Tax, in Journal of Public Economics, 31, 
pp. 119-151.
Haan P. - Wrohlich K. (2007), Optimal Taxation: The Design of Child Related Cash- 
and In-Kind-Benefits, IZA Discussion Papers 3128.
Immervoll H. - Kleven H.J. - Kreiner C.T. - Saez E. (2007), Welfare Reforms in Eu-
ropean Countries: A Microsimulation Analysis, in Economic Journal, 117, pp. 
1-44.
Milgrom P. - Roberts J. (1994), Comparing Equilibria, in American Economic Re-
view, 84(3), pp. 441-459.
Mirrlees J.A. (1971), An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation, in 
Review of Economic Studies, 38, pp. 175-208.
Roth A.E. (2002), The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Eco-
nomics and Computation as Tools of Design Economics, in Econometrica, 70, 
pp. 1341-1378.
Saez E. (2001), Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates, in Review of 
Economic Studies, 68, pp. 205-229.
Saez E. (2002), Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive La-
bour Supply Responses, in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, pp. 1039-1073.
Tuomala M. (1984), On the optimal income taxation: some further numerical results, 
in Journal of Public Economics, 23, pp. 351-66.
Tuomala M. (1990), Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press.
Tuomala M. (2006), On the shape of optimal non-linear income tax schedule, Tampere 
Economic Working Papers, No. 49.
Tuomala M. (2008), On optimal non-linear income taxation: numerical results revis-
ited, Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Tampere.
Van Parijs P. (1995), Real Freedom for All, Oxford University Press.
70
Abstract:
In this paper we present a critical survey of two «generations» of studies addressing the 
empirical computation of optimal income taxes. The first generation, from 1971 up to the late 
’90s, mainly consists of illustrative numerical exercises rather than of empirical applications. 
The optimal tax-transfer regime that most commonly emerges from these efforts is a negative 
income tax + a (almost) flat tax. The second generation is characterized by a more definite 
focus on policy implementations and, relying on extensions or reformulations of Mirrlees’s 
model, attempts to establish a closer connection between theory and data or econometric esti-
mates. We argue that both generations of studies suffer from taking for granted that the solu-
tion to the optimal taxation problem must be an analytical one (a «formula»), to be fed with 
numerical guesses or estimates. As a first consequence, the theoretical models must adopt very 
restrictive assumptions in order to generate analytical solutions. As a second consequence, 
the theoretical results are potentially inconsistent with the empirical estimates that are typi-
cally generated under very different (much less restrictive) assumptions. A different approach 
would consist in avoiding restrictive theoretical assumptions and obtaining the solution com-
putationally by iteratively simulating a microeconometric model. This approach is exemplified 
here with the computation of optima taxes in Norway and with the evaluation of alternative 
basic income mechanisms in some European countries.
